The system B+ is the minimal positive relevant logic. B+ is trivially extended to B+T on adding a greatest truth (Church constant) T. If we leave ∨ out of the formation apparatus, we get the fragment B∧T. It is known that the set of  B∧T theories provides a good model for the combinators CL at Level-I, which is the theory level. Restoring ∨ to get back B+T was not previously fruitful at Level-I, because the set of all B+T theories is  a model of CL. It was to be expected from semantic completeness arguments for relevant logics that basic combinator laws would hold when restricted to  B+T theories. Overcoming some previous difficulties, we show that this is the case, at Level I. But this does not form a model for CL. This paper also looks for corresponding results at Level-II, where we deal with sets of theories that we call propositions. We adapt work by Ghilezan to note that at Level-II also there is a model of CL in B∧T propositions. However, the corresponding result for B+T propositions extends smoothly to Level-II only in part. Specifically, only some of the basic combinator laws are proved here. We accordingly leave some work for the reader.
ultrafilters in B. The utility of the ascent to PUB is that there is an isomorphic copy of B itself two levels up. For let an embedding h : B → PUB be defined, by assigning to every element b the set of ultrafilters in B to which it belongs. i.e., for b ∈ B, fix
[Dh] h(b) = {U : b ∈ U and U ∈ UB} Thus every Boolean algebra B finds a home away from home in a PUB.
 3.   Structures may be enriched and completed, as we have just recalled, by raising Levels. We now turn to relevant logics. They have come, semantically, a long way. Beginning in [10] from the Orlov-MohChurch-Anderson-Belnap system R of relevant implication, Routley, Meyer and others produced a series of articles on the Semantics of Entailment, based on Kripke-style ternary relational postulates. In [9] such postulates were found, in the →, ∧, ∨ vocabulary, for the Anderson-Belnap systems R+ of positive relevant implication, E+ of positive entailment, and T+ of positive ticket entailment. Among these positive relevant logics there was a new and natural minimal one, which we called B+.
We concentrate, in this paper, on B+, and on the fragments, alternative formulations and conservative extensions that make up what we may call the B+ family of minimal logics. We will be concerned, in our work with the B+ family, with collections of formal objects at Levels I and II. At Level-I our focus is on theories-intuitively, sets of sentences that are logically closed. We concentrate at Level-II on what we call propositions 1 -special collections of theories.  4.    λ- Our next topic will be the Combinatory Logic CL of Curry and Feys [3] . There is a delightful coincidence between axiom candidates for various relevant logics and the combinators of which, on the analysis of Curry, these candidate axioms were (in Curryspeak) the "functional characters" (nowadays "types"). In fact the coincidence not only reflected Curry but improved him; some combinators untypeable by Curry correspond anyway to famous theorems of logic, which have been embraced (and repudiated) with vigor.
Twenty years ago, this coincidence was independently rediscovered and deepened by researchers in λ-calculus; specifically, by Dezani and her colleagues in [1] and elsewhere. They added intersection types to Curry's arrow types. (Add with [5] type intersection for logical ∧ to Curry's original function type for logical →, and behold the improvement.) As relevant semantical analysis predicted, further combinators (sample: W * , equivalently WI, SII, or λx.xx) have non-trivial types in the enriched setup. And the structure of these types is that conferred by the analysis of conjunction ∧ and implication → in the minimal relevant logic B+ of [9] .
So exciting are the connections between CL and relevant logics that we have dubbed them The Key to the Universe. There is already good evidence that the key fits because there are the semantical completeness proofs themselves. Here, we shall insert that key a little further into its lock. We look again at how to account for disjunction ∨ in modeling CL. For ∨ (with its usual truthfunctional semantics) has been an ingredient in B+ and other relevant logics from the beginning. Dezani, Meyer and Motohama did offer a B+T model of λ and CL in [5] , appealing to (so-called) Harrop theories. A principal result here is a better fit with the semantical and logical intuitions of [9] . We look to prime B+T-theories in general, and not just the Harrop subclass thereof, as the appropriate vehicle with which to make the laws governing primitive CL combinators true. But Dezani and her colleagues, for their part, are not to be denied. For it was (what we call) the Better Bubbling Lemma (henceforth, ) of Dezani et al. in [6] that led to our new verification of the primitive combinatory equations in prime B+T theories.
In this paper, we follow [8] to move from Level-I to Level-II to find systems which model λ and hence CL. Levels arise out of the way one looks at systems. We discuss, as anticipated above, three levels. (You can have more, if you like.) Level-0 is that of the elements of a given logical algebra-typically, an Algebra of Formulas, where each element is a Well-Formed-Formula (). 2 For present purposes, at Level-I each element is a theory, which is a collection of s with some nice properties like closure under conjunction and entailment. (For technical reasons involving the relevantly irrelevant combinator K and other cancellators, we follow [5] by requiring the theories of this paper to be non-empty.) At Level-II we have propositions, which are collections of theories with further nice properties. (We trust that theories and propositions will become more clear as we go along.)
We recall the definition of B∧T as a relational system from [5] . B∧T is little more than a fragment of B+. In presenting B∧T, we had a choice between an assertional and a relational formulation. 3 This is a distinction without much of a difference, since to assert A → B as a theorem of logic comes sensibly to the same thing (when all the "i"s are dotted and "t"s are crossed) as to claim that A logically entails B. 4 B∧T is the →, ∧ fragment of B+, enriched with a greatest truth, given by Church constant T. Upper-case 'A', 'B', etc. are used to denote syntactical variables. is a binary predicate in the language, which is read as 'entails'. With these we state the formal definition of the B∧T system. The axioms for the B∧T system are as follows:
The rules of the system are as follows. (Note that ⇒ has been used as a metalogical connective in framing rules.)
Our first task now is to prove that the results at Level-I extend smoothly to Level-II for B∧T theories. The idea of moving to Level-II is for some obvious reasons which will be made clear soon. But first we start with some definitions and theorems and prove that the results for B∧T theories hold at Level-II also.
D 1 () A  or B∧T- is a non-empty set of formulas closed under conjunction and B∧T-entailment.
D 2 (A-) An A- (denoted "A↑") is a theory containing the formula A and all the formulas C that are B∧T-entailed by A, i.e., A↑ = {C : A C}.
T 1 The intersection of two theories is a theory.
P Let T 1 and T 2 be two theories. So,
and A B. It follows that A ∈ T 1 and A B, so B ∈ T 1 (since T 1 is a theory).
and thus A ∧ B ∈ T 1 (since T 1 is a theory), and similarly, A ∧ B ∈ T 2 . Hence,
A. To formulate a system relationally is to choose a 2-place predicator (say ) and to insist that the elementary statements (and hence the theorems) are things of the form A B. D 3 () A B∧T- P is a non-empty set of theories closed under sub-theory relation and intersection. That is (i) if T 1 and T 2 are two theories, T 1 ⊆ T 2 and T 1 ∈ P, then T 2 ∈ P, and (ii) if T 1 ∈ P and T 2 ∈ P, then T 1 ∩ T 2 ∈ P. D 4 (A-) An A- (written "A", and also called the principal proposition for the formula A) is the proposition consisting of A↑ and all of its its super-theories (it is of course closed under intersection).
In what immediately follows, we will call a B∧T theory simply a theory; B∧T proposition, a proposition; and B∧T entailment, entailment. We will also use T 1 , T 2 , etc. to denote theories, P, Q, etc. to denote propositions, A, B, etc. to denote principal propositions for formulas A, B, etc., and A, B, etc. to denote well formed formulas. Notice that by the axioms of B∧T, T and T → T belong to every theory of B∧T. The propositions, on the other hand, are by definition non-empty. We take our next definition from [8] .
D 5 ( ) A set Θ is said to be  if (i) if α ∈ Θ and α ⊆ β then β ∈ Θ, and (ii) If i∈I α i ∈ Θ then ∃i 0 ∈ I such that α i 0 ∈ Θ.
T 2 An A-Theory is the minimum theory containing A. P Suppose T 1 is a theory containing A. Since T 1 is a theory, it is closed under conjunction and entailment relation. Therefore, for all formulas B where A B, B ∈ T 1 . Hence, A↑ ⊆ T 1 . T 3 An A-proposition is the minimum proposition containing A↑. P Suppose P is a proposition containing A↑. Since P is a proposition, it is closed under sub-theory relation and intersection. Therefore, all theories of which A↑ is a sub-theory, i.e., all super-theories of A↑ belong to P and hence also their intersections. Hence, A ⊆ P.
T 4 Any principal proposition is open.
P (i) Let T 1 ∈ A and T 1 ⊆ T 2 . So T 2 ∈ A (since A is closed under subtheory relation). (ii) Suppose that i∈I α i ∈ A (each α i is a theory). It follows that A↑ ⊆ i∈I α i , and hence A ∈ i∈I α i , and it follows that there is some i 0 ∈ I where A ∈ α i 0 . So, ∃i 0 ∈ I such that A↑ ⊆ α i 0 (since α i 0 is a theory), and it follows that ∃i 0 ∈ I such that α i 0 ∈ A. Hence, any principal proposition is open.
T 5 Any theory T 1 = {B↑ : B ∈ T 1 }. P Let B ∈ T 1 . We have B ∈ B↑, so B ∈ {B↑ : B ∈ T 1 }. Conversely, suppose C ∈ {B↑ : B ∈ T 1 }. So, there is some B ∈ T 1 such that C ∈ B↑. Since T 1 is a theory and B ∈ T 1 , it follows that B↑ ⊆ T 1 (by Theorem 2). So, C ∈ T 1 , and hence, T 1 = {B↑ : B ∈ T 1 }.
T 6 For principal proposition
P Consider B such that B↑ ∈ A. Since B is the smallest proposition containing B↑, B and so {B : B↑ ∈ A} is a subset of A. Conversely suppose T 1 ∈ A. Clearly, T 1 = ∅. Now T 1 = {C↑ : C ∈ T 1 } and so {C↑ : C ∈ T 1 } ∈ A. But A is open and C↑ is a theory for each C. Hence there is a C ∈ T 1 such that C↑ ∈ A. Also, C↑ ⊆ T 1 (by Theorem 2). Therefore T 1 ∈ C, and so, T 1 ∈ {C : C↑ ∈ A}. Therefore, A ⊆ {B : B↑ ∈ A}, and hence, A = {B : B↑ ∈ A}.
T 7 The intersection of two propositions is always non-empty.
P Suppose P and Q are two propositions. By definition, P = ∅ = Q. So, there are T 1 , T 2 such that T 1 ∈ P and T 2 ∈ Q. Now, T 1 = {C↑ : C ∈ T 1 }, and
Clearly, T 1 ⊆ T 3 and T 2 ⊆ T 3 . Therefore, T 3 ∈ P and T 3 ∈ Q, i.e., T 3 ∈ P ∩ Q. We have shown that P ∩ Q is non-empty.
T 8 The intersection of two propositions is always a proposition.
P Let P and Q be two propositions. By Theorem 6, P ∩ Q = ∅. (i) Suppose T 1 ∈ P ∩ Q and T 1 ⊆ T 2 . Then T 1 ∈ P and T 1 ⊆ T 2 and P is a proposition. Therefore, T 2 ∈ P. Similarly T 2 ∈ Q. And hence T 2 ∈ P ∩ Q. (ii) Suppose that T 1 and T 2 ∈ P∩Q. Then T 1 and T 2 ∈ P and so T 1 ∩T 2 ∈ P. Similarly, T 1 ∩ T 2 ∈ Q. And hence T 1 ∩ T 2 ∈ P ∩ Q. Therefore, P ∩ Q is closed under the sub-theory relation and under intersection, and is non-empty. It follows that it is a propositon.
T 9 The intersection of two principal propositions is a principal proposition.
P Suppose that A and B are two principal propositions. Now, A = {T 1 : A↑ ⊆ T 1 } and B = {T 2 : B↑ ⊆ T 2 }. We have already proved that A ∩ B is a proposition. So now we need to show that it is a principal proposition. Claim:
This holds if and only if A↑ ⊆ T 1 and B↑ ⊆ T 1 which, in turn, holds if and only if A ∈ T 1 and B ∈ T 1 , if and only if A ∧ B ∈ T 1 (since, T 1 is a theory). This is equivalent to (A ∧ B)↑ ⊆ T 1 (by Theorem 5), and hence T 1 ∈ (A ∧ B). The intersection of two principal propositions is a principal proposition.
B∧T       -
The idea of a model for combinators at a Level is that the elements on which the combinators operate are elements of that particular Level. The defining equation for any combinator also depends on the Level at which we work. For example, at Level-I, we assign a theory to each combinator or other combinatorial term. But at Level-II, we assign propositions to combinators. And then we show that, where t = u is a provable equation of CL, both t and u must be assigned the same object. The larger part of this task is to show that the defining equations for particular combinators turn out true. 5 But it is meet also to show that we have so fashioned our semantic apparatus that the rules of inference 6 of CL are truth-preserving.
We will look at defining equations for three combinators in particular here, namely, I, K and W * . For these combinators, we will prove that the defining equations turn out true in B∧T-theories. Proofs for the other combinators are similar and hence are omitted here. Let's start with the definition of the fusion operator at different Levels and a basic lemma. D 6 (   -0) We can introduce the fusion operator '•' at Level-0 by just including it in our vocabulary as one more sentential connective, together with a "residuation" rule. While [9] shows that this produces conservative extensions of standard relevant logics (including those of this paper), we resist that course here. D 7 (  - (• 1 )) Let T 1 and T 2 be two theories. Then
The fusion of two theories is also a theory.
P Let T 1 and T 2 be two theories. (i) T → T ∈ T 1 and T ∈ T 2 . Therefore,
Thus, T 1 • 1 T 2 is non-empty and also closed under conjunction and entailment. Hence it is a theory.
C 11 The fusion of a finite number of theories is also a theory.
P Use induction and Lemma 10. Now we will prove that B∧T-theories model the three combinators mentioned above. Here are defining equations for some combinators.
We assign a particular theory to each combinator. To indicate the assignment succinctly, we enclose a formula scheme in brackets. The associated theory T is then the smallest set of formulas that contains all conjunctions of one or more instances of the scheme and which is closed under the entailment relation . Here are the definitions.
= {C : for some finite set M and formulas A m ,
The definitions for the theories assigned to each of the combinators are similar to that for I. For example, a formula D belongs to the set K iff there is some conjunction C of formulas of the form A → (B → A) such that C D. Here we show that the set I is indeed a theory. Proofs for other combinators are similar.
P (i) [A → A] contains all instances of the formulas of the kind
is non-empty and closed under conjunction and entailment. Hence, it is a theory.
We come now to the famous Bubbling Lemma (), which was a principal weapon invoked in [1] to show that filters on intersection types provide a model of λ. It will play the same role here for us, changing only the vocabulary to say that B∧T-theories provide a model for combinators. 
Then ∃B where B → A ∈ I and B ∈ T 1 . But B → A ∈ I means that there is a finite M where k∈M (A k → A k ) B → A. Therefore, by the Bubbling Lemma, B j∈J A j and j∈J A j A for some J ⊆ M. Since B ∈ T 1 and T 1 is a theory, it follows that j∈J A j ∈ T 1 . And hence, A ∈ T 1 (for similar reasons.). So,
and D j ∈ T 1 . And so, ∀j ∈ J, E j ∈ T 1 • 1 T 1 . Therefore, j∈J E j ∈ T 1 . And hence,
We have left it to you, dear reader, to verify the defining axioms for the other combinators. But, to be sure that we have a model of CL in Level-I theories, we must show also that truth of the theorems of this system is preserved under the rules. These are succinctly stated in [2, p. 231f].
We note simply that, since fusion at Level-I is a single-valued operation on B∧T-theories and since equality is set equality, all of the rules preserve truth, ending the demonstration that there is a model of CL in B∧T-theories, on any assignment of such theories to free variables.
B∧T       -
Having proved that B∧T-theories provide a good model for the combinators at Level-I, we will now prove the same results at Level-II, i. e., B∧T-propositions also provide a good model for the combinators. Let's start with the definitions of the combinators at Level-II.
Here ι, κ and ω are the Level-II correspondance of I, K and W * respectively. The definitions of the other combinators follow on similar lines. The idea behind using Greek notations for the combinators at Level-II is just to remove ambiguity with those at Level-I. L 17 Suppose T 1 , T 2 , T 3 and T 4 are four theories such that T 1 ⊆ T 2 and
Then there is some B such that B → A ∈ T 1 and B ∈ T 3 . Therefore, B → A ∈ T 2 and B ∈ T 4 (since T 1 ⊆ T 2 and
L 18 Suppose P, Q, R and S are four propositions such that P ⊆ R and Q ⊆ S.
P Suppose T 1 ∈ P • 2 Q. ⇒ ∃ T 2 ∈ P and T 3 ∈ Q such that T 2 • 1 T 3 ⊆ T 1 . But then, T 2 ∈ R and T 3 ∈ S (since P ⊆ R and Q ⊆ S). Therefore,
L 19
The fusion of two propositions is also a proposition. P Let P, Q be two propositions. (i) Since P = ∅ = Q, it follows that ∃T 1 and T 2 such that T 1 ∈ P and T 2 ∈ Q. Now, T 1 • 1 T 2 is a theory (by Lemma 10) . And by definition, T 1 • 1 T 2 ∈ P • 2 Q. Hence, P • 2 Q is non-empty. (ii) Suppose T 1 ∈ P • 2 Q and T 1 ⊆ T 2 and T 2 is a theory. So, ∃T 3 ∈ P and T 4 ∈ Q where
It follows that (∃ T 3 ∈ P and T 4 ∈ Q where (T 3 • 1 T 4 ⊆ T 1 )) and (∃ T 5 ∈ P and T 6 ∈ Q where
non-empty and closed under intersection and sub-theory relation. And hence is a proposition.
T 20 The fusion of finite number of propositions is a proposition.
P By induction on the previous result.
C 21 ι • 2 P = P. P Suppose T 1 ∈ ι • 2 P. It follows that there is some T 2 ∈ ι and 14) . ⇒ T 3 ⊆ T 1 and hence, T 1 ∈ P. Therefore, ι • 2 P ⊆ P. Conversely, suppose T 1 ∈ P. It follows that I • 1 T 1 (= T 1 ) ⊆ T 1 . Hence, T 1 ∈ ι • 2 P. Therefore, P ⊆ ι • 2 P. And so, ι • 2 P = P.
So, there is some T 2 ∈ κ, and a T 3 ∈ P and
Since Q is not empty by definition, there is a T 2 ∈ Q. K of course belongs to κ. Also,
and hence T 1 ∈ P • 2 P. Therefore, ω • 2 P ⊆ P • 2 P. Conversely, suppose T 1 ∈ P • 2 P. ⇒ T 2 ∈ P and T 3 ∈ P such that T 2 • 1 T 3 ⊆ T 1 . But T 2 ∈ P and T 3 ∈ P ⇒ T 2 ∩ T 3 ∈ P. W * of course belongs to ω. Also,
We conclude this section as we did the last, leaving the verification of other primitive combinator equalities to readers; note that the rules of [2] preserve equality of propositions at Level-II as they did of theories at Level-I.
   B∧T   B+T  -
Having shown that B∧T-theories are a model for the combinators at Level-I and B∧T-propositions are a model for the combinators at Level-II, we now try to extend the results to B+T-theories and propositions. But we are stuck at the very beginning because it is shown in [5] that there is no model for λ in the set of all B+T-theories. For the same reason, there is no model for the combinators there. But we can model the basic combinator laws in prime B+T theories, as we proceed to show. Recall that T 1 is a prime theory if A ∨ B ∈ T 1 ⇒ either A ∈ T 1 or B ∈ T 1 . Again we will talk of only the three combinators I, K and W * . The proofs for other primitive combinators from among C, C * , B, B , S and W are similar. For the proofs to go through, we will need what we call the Better Bubbling Lemma (). This is a very important generalization of the Bubbling Lemma  above. 7 For proofs of , see [7] and [6] . We only state it here.
L 24 (  ) For any finite sets {σ i → τ i } i∈M and {σ j → τ j } j∈J of arrow types, the following equivalence holds: A ⇔ F where [6] .
From this point on, we will call a B+T theory simply a theory; a B+T proposition, a proposition; and B+T entailment, entailment. We will also use T 1 , T 2 , etc. to denote theories, P, Q, etc. to denote propositions, A, B, etc. to denote principal propositions for formulas A, B, etc., and A, B, etc. to denote well formed formulas. Let us first look at the set of axioms and rules of B+T. The axioms are as follows. 8 Reflex
7 It is our impression, based on conversations with Dezani, that  is mainly due to her and  to Castagna. 8 in contrast to B∧T above, we formulate B+T as an assertional system. But we suppress . To restore it in approved Curry [4] fashion, preface each formula asserted as an axiom with . Make a similar adjustment in the rules.
The rules for the system B+T are as follows. Note that ⇒ is again a metalogical connective used to express rules.
In what follows, we will show how the prime theories satisfy the combinators. We will show this for the combinators I, K and W * . For the others, the proofs follow on similar lines. Caution: It is necessary to be delicate at this point. What we are proving here (or leaving for you to prove) is that the defining equations for particular primitive combinators are true, when their arguments are assigned prime B+T theories. It is also the case that the primitive combinators will be assigned prime theories. Not only that, but any theory all of whose members are entailed by conjunctions of arrow statements will also be prime. 9 This means that prime theories are rather thick on the ground. Nonetheless, as we warn again below, neither the fusion nor the intersection of two prime theories is in general prime. Beware.
C 25 Suppose T 1 is a prime theory. Then
A. Now, ∀j ∈ S, C j ∈ T 1 (by definition of S). Hence, j∈S C j ∈ T 1 (since T 1 is a theory). Therefore, A ∈ T 1 . And so,
B i∈M E i . Since, B ∈ T 1 and T 1 is a theory, therefore, i∈M E i ∈ T 1 . Since,
Again by Lemma 24, C j∈S D j . Since, C ∈ T 2 and T 2 is a theory, therefore, j∈S D j ∈ T 2 . Since, T 2 is prime, there is a j 0 ∈ S such that D j 0 ∈ T 2 . Define S = {j ∈ S :
A. Now ∀k ∈ S , E k ∈ T 1 (by definition and since S S). Hence, k∈S E k ∈ T 1 (since T 1 is a theory) . Therefore, A ∈ T 1 . And so,
Conversely, suppose A ∈ T 1 . Since T 2 is not empty, there is some B such that B ∈ T 2 . By definition, (A → (B → A) 
Since, B ∈ T 1 and T 1 is a theory, it follows that, i∈M ((
  
In the above section, we have seen that the prime theories of B+T do a really good job, satisfying all the primitive combinator equalities. So the question arises: Is the set of prime theories of B+T a model for the combinators? The answer is "No." We must face the real problem, because prime theories are neither closed under fusion nor closed under intersection. 10 So what do we do? The most logical thing to do is to expand a non-prime theory T 1 to a prime theory. But this can be done in more than one way. So 10 Specifically, consider the following counterexample, adapted from Dezani. Recall that we interpret W = [(A → (A → B)) → (A → B)], now in the B+T vocabulary. Where p, q, r are propositional variables, define theories T 1 and T 2 thus: T 1 is the principal theory (p → (p → r)) ∧ (q → (q → r))↑. Similarly let T 2 be the principal theory p ∨ q↑. T 1 is prime, though T 2 clearly is not prime. Computing, r ∈ W • 1 T 1 • 1 T 2 . But r sadly fails to belong to
This refutes on interpretation in arbitrary B+T theories the W law. Worse, this counterexample can be massaged so that all theories involved are prime. For, where s is another propositional variable, we may simply let T 2 = T 3 • 1 T 4 , where T 3 is the principal theory s → p ∨ q↑ and T 4 is just s↑. The verification that we have left for the reader now fails for W, our appeal to  being blocked because T 2 , though now defined as a fusion of prime theories, remains resolutely non-prime.
which theory should we choose as our prime extension of T 1 ? A natural solution is to look at all the prime theories which are super theories of T 1 . And that is how propositions originate. But in the B+T case we will try to define something more precise, namely, prime propositions. We supply these with a corresponding fusion operator (say, prime fusion) in the hope that the propositions will then have nice properties. So here we go. D 9 ( ) A non-empty collection of theories P is said to be a prime proposition if (i) for each T 1 ∈ P, T 1 is a prime theory. (ii) If T 1 ∈ P, T 1 ⊆ T 2 and T 2 is a prime theory, then T 2 ∈ P. D 10 (   (• 2 )) Suppose P and Q are two prime propositions. Then their prime fusion is defined as follows
The intersection of two prime propositions is always non-empty.
P Suppose P and Q are two prime propositions. By definition, P = ∅ = Q. It follows that there are T 1 ∈ P, T 2 ∈ Q. Now, T 1 = {C↑ : C ∈ T 1 } And, T 2 = {D↑ : D ∈ T 2 }. Define T 3 = {E : ∃C ∈ T 1 and ∃D ∈ T 2 such that C ∧ D E}. Clearly, T 1 ⊆ T 3 and T 2 ⊆ T 3 . However, T 3 need not be prime. But we can always extend it to some prime theory T 4 such that T 3 ⊆ T 4 . Therefore, T 4 ∈ P and T 4 ∈ Q, i. e., T 4 ∈ P ∩ Q. And hence, P ∩ Q is non-empty.
T 29 The intersection of two prime propositions is always a prime proposition.
P Let P and Q be two prime propositions. By Theorem 27, P ∩ Q = ∅. (i) Suppose T 1 ∈ P ∩ Q. Then T 1 ∈ P and hence, T 1 is prime. (ii) Suppose T 1 ∈ P ∩ Q and T 1 ⊆ T 2 and T 2 is prime. Then T 1 ∈ P, T 1 ⊆ T 2 , T 2 is prime and P is a prime proposition. Therefore, T 2 ∈ P. Similarly T 2 ∈ Q. And hence T 2 ∈ P ∩ Q. Therefore P ∩ Q is non-empty, contains only prime theories and is closed under sub-theory relation. And hence is a prime proposition.
T 30 The prime fusion of two prime propositions is a prime proposition.
P Suppose P and Q are two prime propositions. (i) Let T 1 ∈ P • 2 Q. By definition of • 2 , T 1 is prime. (ii) Since P = ∅ = Q, there are T 1 ∈ P and T 2 ∈ Q. Now, T 1 • 1 T 2 is a theory (by Lemma 10) . But it need not be prime. However we can extend it to a prime theory T 3 such that T 1 • 1 T 2 ⊆ T 3 . Then by definition, T 3 ∈ P• 2 Q. Hence, P• 2 Q is non-empty. (iii) Suppose T 1 ∈ P• 2 Q and T 1 ⊆ T 2 and T 2 is a prime theory. It follows that there are T 3 ∈ P and T 4 ∈ Q such that
Thus, P • 2 Q is non-empty, contains only prime theories and is closed under sub-theory relation. And hence is a prime proposition.
This part was trivial. It is the other part where we actually get stuck. Conversely, suppose T 1 ∈ P • 2 P. So, there are T 2 ∈ P and T 3 ∈ P such that T 2 • 1 T 3 ⊆ T 1 . Suppose there is a T 4 ∈ P where T 4 ⊆ T 2 and
Now that the attempted proof is over, look back at the part marked "[!!!]". This line causes a problem. It is not always possible to find a prime theory T 4 which is a subset of two given arbitrary prime theories T 2 and T 3 . Consider in this context the boolean algebra on the base set {a, b}. This lattice illustrates our B+T problems. We have {{a}, {a, b}} and {{b}, {a, b}} as two prime theories. (Prime filters, as an algebraist would say.) But the only non-empty theory (filter) that is a subset of both of these is {{a, b}}, which unfortunately is not prime. And that is exactly where we get stuck in all the three cases of W, W * and S. Perhaps we can modify the definitions of prime propositions and/or the prime fusion operator so that the existence of such a T 4 is always guaranteed for arbitrary prime theories T 2 and T 3 while satisfying also nice properties like closure under intersection and fusion. If so, we can hope to get a model for the combinators in B+T-prime propositions. Also note that because of what we have claimed in this paper, any subset of the prime theories of B+T, which is closed under intersection and fusion, is definitely a model for CL. But finding one such subset is not an easy goal. We entreat your help.
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